NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (1769-1821). Emperor of the French.
Highly important official copy of the otherwise unknown letter by Napoleon concerning the Retreat from Moscow, 2½ pages folio, 'à Moscou, le 16 octobre 1812'. With a postscript dated the following day, to his secretary Hughes Maret, duc de Bassano (at Vilna).
The letter is apparently unpublished and otherwise unknown. It is not printed in the Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, nor in the Dernières Lettres Inédites, ed. L. de Brotonne, 1903, nor in the Correspondance inédite de Napoléon Ier conservée aux archives de la guerre, ed. E. Picard and L. Tuetey, 1925. Neither can it be found in Grouchy: Lettres, ordres et decrets non insérés dans la correpondance, nor the Supplément, lettres curieuses omises par le comité de rédaction.
 Written on two conjugate leaves leaves of contemporary official paper, the first leaf water-marked with a head of Napoleon encircled by the letters 'Napoleon Empereur des Francais et Roi d'Italie' the second leaf water-marked with an eagle. Some wear in the folds.
 The emperor informs Maret of his intention to abandon Moscow, and to blow up the Kremlin, using the powder left behind by the Russians; he describes the desolation of Moscow; explains his reasons for leaving Moscow, arguing that it is of no military importance, and unfolds his intended strategy for the winter, his object being to take up winter quarters in the area of Smolensk (350 km. to the west of Moscow) and to prepare for a campaign against Street Petersburg; he instructs Maret to send a copy of this letter to the Minister of the Interior (Fouch‚) so that he can prepare opinion in France; Fouquet should develop Napoleon's arguments and show that this plan will secure peace and bring about the enemy's defeat in the coming campaign; Napoleon emphasises that the letter itself must be kept secret, and that his plans are contingent, so that Fouquet must wait upon events before allowing any publicity about the advantages of Napoleon's strategy; he also instructs Maret to inform Count Otto, the French Amassador at Vienna, and three other French diplomatic representatives about these plans; in the postscript - "pour que cela soit bien entendu" - Napoleon emphasises that nothing must be said or published in advance of events since the situation is fluid.
 It seems very likely that the present contemporary copy gives the hitherto largely unknown text of a letter sent in cipher by Napoleon from Moscow, the enciphered version of which was known to the editors of the Correspondance de Napol‚on Ier, who refer to it as written from Moscow at the same date, 16 October 1812, as that of the present text. The editors confessed their inability to decipher Napoleon's letter, however, referring to it as 'Lettre en chiffre dont il n'a pas ‚t‚ possible de fair la traduction' (Correspondance, XXIV, 1868, page 265). The location of the ciphered text seems also to be presently unknown.
 The present manuscript contains a text which is evidently of historical importance. Part of Napoleon's words in the text are reproduced, either textually or paraphrased, by Maret, in a letter of 26 October 1812 from Vilna to Count Otto, extracts from which were printed by the editors of the Correspondance de Napol‚on Ier (XXIV, pages 265-6) as a substitute for the enciphered letter which they could not read. These extracts, however, contain only about one third of the present text. In particular Maret's letter omits Napoleon's detailed justification of his intended strategy, his intention to blow up the Kremlin, his references to the desolation of Moscow, his instructions concerning French ambassadors, and his very detailed instructions for action to be taken by Fouquet in France.
 A number of words in the present manuscript are underlined in the hand of a contemportary, who may well have been either Maret or Fouquet, who alone were authorised to have the text of this secret letter.With a transcript and translation.

I informed you 3 or 4 days ago of my intention to leave Moscow for a position between Smolensk and Vitebsk. I have therefore evacuated some 2000 or 3000 sick and wounded to Smolensk and I intend to leave for Kaluga on 19th to engage the enemy if, as they announce, they intend to invest this town. Depending on the weather, I shall then either head for Tula and Bravsk or return directly to Smolensk if the weather turns bad. I expect to take up my winter quarters between Smolensk, Minsk and Mogilev in the first week of November. I am blowing up the Kremlin, the arsenal and the fortifications, which is a simple matter given the 200,000 barrels of gunpowder left behind by the Russians; I have determined on this action because Moscow is in ruins and uninhabited. Moscow is no longer of military importance for me, since it is 215 leagues from there to Kiev, whereas from Smolensk to Kiev is only 112. Similarly, from Vitebsk to Petersburg is only 140 leagues, whereas from Moscow to Petersburg is 190. In any case, a march from Moscow to Petersburg would entail a line of operation reaching to Vitebsk. All these considerations therefore lead me to evacuate a place which is no longer of military significance for future operations and thus has no strategic importance, given that it has been totally destroyed. I am giving you all these details in order that you should be fully informed and in a position to formulate a briefing for my ministers. You can add a purely personal angle, which is that in the winter season when no fighting is possible I wish to be in a friendly country in order to gather strength for the Petersburg campaign, and within reach of anywhere my presence is needed.
As it is desirable that the Minister of Police should make a statement, send him a copy of this letter, solely for his own use and with strict instructions to keep it secret. You might even tell him to prepare a few articles on the campaign for the minor newspapers, to expand on the reasons and advantages of this plan, which will ensure peace and the defeat of the enemy through the destruction of their second city in the next campaign. However, as far as the letter for the Minister of Police is concerned, you should tell him that it is provisional and that he must await the events before speaking or writing. You may also write to Otto, St Marsan, Alquier and Andreossi, but as a provisional matter to be kept in reserve.
Moscow, 16 October 1812
PS of 17 October.I repeat in a postscript in order to make absolutely clear that nothing should be said or published ahead of the event, because in this kind of situation events can change; it is with this emphasis that you must write to Paris and to my ministers.

Interestingly, the Bulletin de la Grande Arm‚e for 14 October 1812 states inter alia 'Tous nos bless‚s sont ‚vacu‚s sur Smolensk, Minsk et Moguilev ... Le projet d'incendier Moscou ayant ‚t‚ tenu secret, la plupart des seigneurs et des particuliers n'ont rien enlev‚. les neuf dixièmes [de la ville] n'existent plus'. That for 20 October has several echoes of this letter, some almost verbatim, suggesting that Napoleon's instructions to his ministers to 'faire leur langage' has been heeded:

'On a arm‚ le Kremlin et on l'a fortifi‚.on l'a min‚ pour le faire sauter. Les uns croient que l'Empereur veut marcher sur Toula et Kalouga pour passer l'hiver dans ces provinces. Les autres croient que l'Empereur fera sauter le Kremlin. et qu'il se rapprochera de 100 lieues de la Pologne pour ‚tablier ses quartiers d'hiver dans un pays ami. ceux-ci font l'observation de Moscou est ‚loign‚ de Petersbourg de 180 lieues.'

These bulletins were issued by Clarke, the minister of war.
[No: 25200]